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Abstract: We analyse a public good game with intragroup competition in which, generally but 
not always, the dominant strategy is to not contribu e and, therefore, free-riding is the unique 
Nash equilibrium, not achieving Pareto efficiency. We propose a public good game setup where 
subjects’ contributions are rewarded with different individual returns following a rank order 
voluntary contribution mechanism. It is found that the resulting competition for a better return 
significantly increases contributions. This effect is sensitive to the salience of return differences 
rewarding higher contributions. Furthermore, the positive effect of return differences on 
contribution levels depends on an individual’s retun-to-risk sensitivity as elicited through an 
independent risk elicitation task.  
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1. Introduction 
A public good game (PGG, hereafter) gives rise to a s cial dilemma insofar it leads to a 
conflict between individual and collective incentives. Specifically, in the Nash 
equilibrium, individuals may free ride by contributing nothing to the public good, 
whereas it would be Pareto optimal if all individual resources were invested in the 
public good. An important feature in the emergence of the social dilemma is that 
individuals indistinctively access the public good irrespective of their contributions. On 
the other extreme, if individuals are granted access to the public good in shares equal to 
their participation to the common property, the social dilemma vanishes, provided that 
the net return to individual participation is positive. Therefore, appropriation of the 
return to one’s own investment eliminates the social dilemma. However, this makes the 
essence of a public good disappear, trivially collapsing the context to one of a private 
good. We study the intermediate case arising when heterogeneous individual shares of 
the public resource, rather than proportional to individual contributions, depend on the 
ranking of individual contributions. That is, respectively, higher, intermediate and lower 
shares correspond to the highest, intermediate and lowest contributor.  
An example in which contributors receive different shares from a public good can 
be found in educational systems in which a basic level of the product or service is 
shared by all users, while a higher willingness to pay for it gives access to better 
education. Another example can be found in social security systems which let you 
choose the level of the service, corresponding to different levels of contribution. 
We analyse the role of intragroup competition in the sustainability of cooperation 
in the context of a PGG. In the repeated PGG implemented, intragroup competition is 
introduced by assigning different marginal per capita returns (MPCR, hereafter) 
according to each member’s contribution. In particular, subjects in the same group are 
ranked according to their contributions, so that all subjects receive a positive share of 
the public good but the subject with the highest rank receives the larger share of it. 
While, under certain parameterizations, this context preserves the social dilemma nature 
of a PGG, our experimental results show that it provides an efficient incentive system 
for individual contributions to rise significantly as compared to the standard symmetric-
returns version. As expected, the efficiency of this incentive system in raising individual 
contributions is sensitive to the asymmetry of individual returns resulting from the 
ranking of contributors. Therefore, this system is shown to be an important candidate 
for real-life tax policy measures in which the degree of appropriation of the common 
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resource according to the ranking of contributors to the system could constitute an 
effective incentive for individuals to contribute more, without revealing the exact 
individual contributions to the public good, and, thus, preserving anonymity. 
Furthermore, we analyse whether subjects’ responsive ess to this incentive 
scheme relates to their risk attitudes. Specifically, we obtain individual data from a risk 
elicitation task and analyse whether taking higher risks in the presence of higher risk-
returns predicts higher contributions in the intragroup competitive PGG. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we bri fly review some relevant 
related literature. Section 3 motivates the research question and proposes the theoretical 
prediction of the game. In Section 4 we explain in detail the experimental design and 
state our main research questions. In Section 5 we elaborate the data analysis and show 
the main results. Section 6 concludes. The subjects’ xperimental instructions are in the 
Appendix. 
 
2. State of the art 
Cooperation and its sustainability in a social dilemma is a central research question in 
the economics research agenda. In the basic version of a PGG, it is individually more 
profitable not to contribute and “free ride” on the public good generated by the 
contributions of others.1 However, the socially desirable result (Pareto-effici nt) in 
which all individuals obtain the highest aggregate payoff, is achieved when all subjects 
contribute.  
Experimental research on repeated PGG has often shown that contributions start 
from around 50% of the endowment, declining towards zero as later periods of the 
session as reached. Dealing with the free-riding problem has given rise to alternative 
strategies like allowing communication among subjects (Isaac and Walker, 1988), 
introducing costly punishment (Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003; Fehr and Gatcher, 2000), 
allowing for voluntary participation depending on the share of defectors (Semmann et 
al., 2003), introducing proportional MPCR factors (Colasante and Russo, 2017; Lange 
et al., 2007), and other methods of heterogeneous appropriation of the public good like a 
lottery and an all-pay auction (Corazzini et al., 2010; Faravelli and Stanca, 2012).  
Julian and Perry (1967) were the first to suggest competition (i.e. rivalry among 
players) as a way of solving or at least mitigating the free-rider problem. However, as 
                                                 
1 Such is the game-theoretic prediction since ‘not to contribute’ is a dominant strategy in the one-shot and 
in the finitely repeated version of the game. 
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Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport (2006) suggest, the distinction of ‘between’ versus 
‘within’ group competition is relevant. The literature shows good evidence of the 
positive correlation between inter-group competition and cooperation, and this evidence 
comes both from the lab (see, for example, Bornstei et al., 2002; Cárdenas and 
Mantilla, 2015; Böhm and Rockenbach, 2013; and Markussen et al., 2014) as well as 
from the field (Augenblick and Cunha, 2015; and Erev et al., 1993).2  
Public good dilemmas with intergroup competition, have been analysed under the 
framework of step-level PGG3 (see Rapoport and Bornstein, 1987). The inquiry on the 
intergroup competition by using different social dilemma games leads to an important 
result: competition is a powerful tool to foster cooperation. Bornstein and Ben-Yossef 
(1994) analysed the effect of intergroup conflict in a prisoner’s dilemma game and 
found out that cooperation is significantly higher when competition is introduced. 
Bornstein et al. (2002) studied the effect of intergroup competition on behaviour in the 
minimal-effort game4 and observed that intergroup competition improved collective 
efficiency. In the context of a PGG, Tan and Bolle (2007) analysed the effect of 
competition with and without monetary incentives and detected a stronger effect of 
competition with monetary rewards. Furthermore, Puurtinen and Mappes (2009) 
confirmed that competition fosters cooperation even in a simple one-shot game. 
Interestingly, the contribution by Markussen et al. (2014) introduces the novelty that 
subjects are asked to vote for competition. As a result, the majority of the subjects 
showed a preference for competition, which led in tur  to a higher level of cooperation. 
While the positive effect of intergroup competition on cooperation has been 
sufficiently documented, the effect of intragroup competition in enhancing cooperation 
still remains rather unexplored. One of the first examples is Falkinger’s (1996) 
mechanism for overcoming the free-rider problem, where deviation from the mean 
contribution to the public good are taxed and subsidized, depending on the sign of the 
                                                 
2 A very interesting theoretical approach deals with cooperation and aspects that are out of the scope of 
the present work like the heterogeneity within the group in collective contests (Nitzan and Ueda, 2018), 
the size of the group and the coordinated punishment (Hwang, 2017), or the group formation in 
heterogeneous societies (Lind, 2017). 
3 “In step-level […] public goods a funding threshold has to be reached before the good can be provided. 
[…] The step-level public good game differs strategically from the linear public good game. In the one-
shot linear public good game, the dominant strategy is not to contribute at all. In the one-shot step-level 
public good game multiple Nash equilibria exist. An inefficient Nash equilibrium involves nobody 
contributing. There are efficient Nash equilibria in pure strategies where three of the n players contribute 
(i.e., there are exactly enough contributions to reach the threshold).” (Schram et al. 2008). 
4 The group with the higher minimum won the competition and its members were paid according to the 
game’s pay-off matrix. The members of the losing group received a zero payoff. 
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deviation. Later, Falkinger et al. (2000) conduct a large series of experiment in order to 
examine the empirical properties of the mechanism, obtaining immediate and large 
efficiency gains, and their result is robust throughout many different experimental 
settings. A different type of intragroup competition is considered by Cabrera et al. 
(2013), where subjects are endogenously allocated between a major and a minor league 
according to their performance during the game.  More recently, Angelovski et al. 
(2017) test a provision mechanism which utilizes rank competition to mitigate free-
riding where groups compete via observable contributions for a larger share of the 
public good. They provide evidence that rank competition enhances efficiency in 
situations where discriminatory access to public goods is possible.  
Our paper hopefully contributes to further explore intragroup competition in the 
context of a PGG, focusing on the size of a subject’s ranking-dependent returns from 
the public good and the role of subjects’ risk attitudes on their sensitivity to the 
incentive scheme. 
 
3. Theoretical framework  
We analyse a PGG with intragroup competition in which, under some 
parameterizations, the dominant strategy is to not con ribute and, therefore, free-riding 
is the unique Nash equilibrium (NE), which diverges from the Pareto efficient outcome. 
Alternatively, under other parameterizations, the social dilemma disappears and the NE 
with full contribution of individual resources is Pareto efficient. 
In order to address our research questions, we imple ent a standard PGG, where 
subjects are compensated with a higher individual mrginal return if their contribution 
ranks them higher within their group. We consider three different MPCR values (αH, αM 
and αL) which are endogenously assigned according to subject’s ranking relative to their 
levels of contribution. Levels αH, αM, and αL correspond, respectively, to the individual 
maximal, average and minimal value of the public good return. In other words, the 
subject with the highest contribution will receive the highest individual marginal return, 
the intermediately ranked contributor will receive th  intermediate return and the lowest 
contribution will receive the lowest return. 
Consider the resulting generalized PGG. The payoff of individual i in one period 









απ        
where ie is the initial endowment, ic  is the contribution individual i makes to the 
common project, iα  is the individual marginal return that subject i receives from the 
public good, and n is the number of subjects in the group. Figure 1 shows the extensive 


























































































































































































Figure 1. Example of PGG in extensive form for n=3 where the choices are the 
dominant strategies zero or full contribution 
 
The figure shows the extensive form of the game aftr the iterative elimination of 
the first m-1 strictly dominated strategies. It is trivial to show that contributing any 
amount strictly higher than 0 and strictly lower than e is dominated, respectively, by 
contributing zero or the full endowment. This leaves us with two possible choices: free 
riding (i.e., contributing zero) and full cooperation (i.e., contributing e). Solving the 
game by backward induction, we observe that the game is parameter dependent. 
In our framework, we follow the rank order voluntary contribution mechanism.5  
According to this mechanism, the individual marginal return iα  is determined by the 
contribution rank of individual i. By imposing heterogeneous MPCR and by giving the 
highest return to the player who contributes more, w  hypothesise that, in order to get 
                                                 
5 Angelovsky et al. (2017) use the same mechanism.   
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the highest MPCR, the player would contribute more with respect to the condition in 
which the MPCR is fixed constant for all players within the group.6 
We will now analyse three possible parameterizations of the game which 
correspond to our three treatments, named T0, TH and TL, and described later in Section 
4. In Table 1 we specify the values of MPCR defining each treatment. Under all three 
parameterizations subjects’ initial endowment per period is equal to 100. 
 
Table 1. Values of the MPCR α for each treatment 
 
 T0 TH TL 
αH 0.6 0.9 0.75 
αM 0.6 0.6 0.6 
αL 0.6 0.3 0.45 
 
 
We report in Figure 2 the extensive form of the PGG under the first 


























Figure 2. Extensive form of the PGG in T0 (n=3, e=100, αH = αM = αL = 0.6) 
 
Solving this game by backward induction we get the unique NE of the game in 
)0( 321 === ccc , that is, all players free-ride. 
                                                 
6 In fact, most of the previous literature regarding heterogeneous returns analyse the effect of risky or 
uncertain returns (see, for example, Levati and Morone, 2013 and Fischbacher et al., 2014). In such 
experiments, returns are both heterogeneous and unknown before the provision, as it occurs in our setting. 
However, returns are randomly assigned according to an (un)known probability distribution. In our 
setting, on the opposite, subjects have a little power to influence the MPCR they get: the more they 
invest, the higher the probability to get the highest return. The uncertainty related to the return, in our 
setting, solely depends on the others’ contribution. This is why we expect that competing for a MPCR 
may trigger cooperation. 
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In Figure 3 we report the extensive form of the game under the second 



























Figure 3. Extensive form of the PGG in TH (n=3, e=100, αH = 0.9, αM = 0.6, αL = 0.3) 
 
This version of the game has two NE in pure strategies in )0( 321 === ccc  and 
)100( 321 === ccc . Moreover, the game has one NE in mixed strategies where all 
players choose to free ride with probability 0.51. 
Finally, Figure 4 represents the extensive form of the game under the third 
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Figure 4. Extensive form of the PGG in TL (n=3, e=100, αH = 0.75, αM = 0.6, αL = 0.45) 
 
Solving this version of the game by backward induction we get the unique NE of the 
game: )0( 321 === ccc . In this treatment, this particular parameterization of the 
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incentive system is interesting since it leads to a unique NE, keeping the social dilemma 
nature of the game unchanged. 
 
 
4. Framework and experimental design  
 
4.1. The PGG with intragroup competition 
We implement a repeated PGG with partner matching. We consider heterogeneous 
MPCR factors in order to generate intragroup competition. We run a control treatment 
T0 in which subjects play the standard PGG and two additional treatments, TH and TL. 
In the two new treatments, subjects are ranked according to the size of their own 
contribution. In particular, the highest contributor gets αH as return from the project, the 
second contributor gets αM and the lowest contributor gets αL. Observe in Table 1 that 
treatments TH and TL differ in the three possible values of α. By design, values of 
parameter α are such that in TH, the distance between the maximal, intermediate and 
the minimal values is twice the values in TL.  
Ties are possible in all three treatments. When a tie occurs, the subjects involved 
get the average MPCR, computed as follows. If there are two equal contributions and a 
third one which is lower, the equally contributing subjects get the average between αH 
and αM, and the other gets αL.  In the case in which there are two equal contribu ions 
while there is one contribution higher than them, the two players with equal 
contributions get the average between αL and αM while the higher contributor gets αH.  
Hence, group members contributing the same amount get the same return equal to αM.  Our 
treatments are specifically designed to answer the question whether subjects contribute 
more to the public good in the presence of intragroup competition. Moreover, we also 
test whether such an effect increases with the level of competition and whether it 
depends on subjects’ risk attitudes. 
By accounting for intragroup competition, our setting allows us to address the 
following research questions:  
(R1) The more a group member can individually benefit from the final outcome if 
her contribution is the highest, the more the subject will contribute to the common 
project.  
This conjecture leads to our second research question:  
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(R2) The level of contribution is affected by the salienc  of the difference in 
individual returns rewarding a member’s higher intragroup rank.  
We hypothesise that the higher distance between αH and αL in treatment TH induces a 
higher level of competition as compared to treatment TL and, as a consequence, a higher 
level of contribution. Normally, investing a high percentage in a public good can be 
perceived as risky because it may imply a high potential loss, being this an incentive to 
free-ride. By introducing a competition mechanism partly reduces such a risk. 
Theoretically, players contributing more get a larger benefit. In a broader sense, this 
could be comparable to a proportional system like the one proposed by Colasante and 
Russo (2017) or Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport (2006). In their experiments it emerges 
that, by taking a return proportional to the amount invested, cooperation is sustained. In 
our treatment TH, the maximal return is 0.9, so that the money invested in the public 
good has a similar return to private consumption. Furthermore, the distance between the 
minimal and the maximal MPCR is 0.6 (while it is 0.3 in TL). Therefore, we 
hypothesise that in TL subjects will have less incentive to invest high amounts in the 
public good, since the maximal and intermediate MPCR values are very close.  
A total of 216 undergraduate students from the Universitat Jaume I, Castellón 
(Spain) participated in the experiment. Upon enterig the laboratory, they were 
randomly assigned to visually isolated computer terminals. The instructions were 
distributed in hardcopy. 7 The participants played the PGG for 10 rounds, thi fact being 
common knowledge for subjects from the beginning of the session. Subjects got 
carefully informed about the anonymous group formation and matching protocol used. 
No opportunity was given to subjects to communicate wi hin or between groups during 
the session.  A session lasted up to 50 minutes and average earnings per subject were 
around 12€. 
In all treatments, the decision making process in a session was as follows. In every 
round, each subject received an initial endowment of 100 Experimental Currency Units 
(ExCUs) and had to decide – privately and anonymously – how much of this endowment 
to allocate to a common project, the rest kept privately. Once all members of the group 
had submitted their decision, subjects got perfect information about the last period 
contribution of other players in the same group.  Furthermore, subjects had information 
about the exact MPCRs of the specific treatment.  I other words, participants in the 
                                                 
7 See the instructions to experimental subjects in the Appendix. 
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baseline knew that the MPCR was the same for all subjects, while the ones taking part 
in treatments TH and TL knew that the MPCR depended on the individual contribution 
levels and, therefore, that there was competition within the group. At the end of each 
period, subjects received feedback about their own payoff for that period.  
4.2. Elicitation of risk attitudes 
At the end of period 10, we elicited each subject’s a titude towards risk.8 To do that, we 
implemented the Lottery Panel risk elicitation task, by Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis 
(2002), in which each subject chooses his/her preferred lottery from each panel of the 
four in Figure 5.  
 
Panel 1 
Prob. 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 
€ 1.00 1.10 1.30 1.50 1.70 2.10 2.70 3.60 5.40 10.90 
Choice            
 
Panel 2 
Prob. 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 
€ 1.00 1.20 1.50 1.90 2.30 3.00 4.00 5.70 9.00 19.00 
Choice           
 
Panel 3 
Prob. 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 
€ 1.00 1.70 2.50 3.60 5.00 7.00 10.00 15.00 25.00 55.00 
Choice           
 
Panel 4 
Prob. 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0,4 0.3 0.2 0.1 
€ 1.00 2.20 3.80 5.70 8.30 12.00 17.50 26.70 45.00 100.00 
Choice 
          
 
Figure 5: The Lottery Panels risk elicitation task 
 
The risk elicitation task used here faces subjects with four decision problems. In 
each one of them, a panel of nine binary lotteries and a trivial one (leading to the certain 
gain of 1€) are offered for them to choose one. In each non trivial lottery, a positive 
outcome entails a probability q of earning Y€ and a probability 1-q to earn nothing. 
Each lottery panel is constructed in a way such that riskier lotteries (involving a higher 
                                                 
8 At the beginning of the session, the instructions were read aloud and subjects were told that immediat ly 
after period 10, they would have to answer some questions that would also affect the final earnings.  
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the expected payoff is increased above the certain reward of 1€ by an amount which is 
proportional to the probability of the unfavorable outcome. The four lottery panels – 
that we will denote as P1 to P4) correspond to different values of the risk-return 
parameter t, generating an increase in the lotteries’ expected values as one moves from 
safer options (left side of the lottery panels) to riskier ones (right side of the lottery 
panels) within the same panel. In particular, the four panels of lotteries were constructed 
using m = 1€ in all lottery panels and t = 0.1, 1, 5 and 10, respectively for lottery panels 
P1 to P4, respectively. By the definition of the task, Expected Utility maximizers with a 
higher degree of risk aversion will choose weakly (due to the discreteness and the 
boundaries of the choice space) higher probability lotteries. It has been shown 
elsewhere that if they have a standard CRRA utility functions their choices will be 
weakly riskier as we move from P1 to P4. Given the increasing Expected Value of 
lotteries as the winning probability is decreased, risk neutral and risk loving subjects 
should choose the lowest winning probability lottery with q=0.1.9 
Based on a large sample (N=785) which was almost equally split between 
financially rewarded and hypothetical choices (N=401 and N=385, respectively), 
García-Gallego et al. (2012) show that over 85% of choices can be explained by two 
orthogonal factors. The first factor weights equally subjects’ choices in the four lottery 
panels and can be meaningfully interpreted as a subject’s aversion to risk, given that the 
average choice in the four lottery panels indicates a ubject’s unwillingness to take 
risks. We will approximate this Factor1 by a subject’s average choice across the four 
lottery panels and we will use the term ‘risk aversion’ to refer to it. The second factor 
weights negatively the choices in P1 and P2 and positively the P3 and P4 choices. 
Furthermore, the extreme lottery panels P1 and P4 are weighted equally to each other in 
absolute terms and double as much as choices in P2 and P3. Therefore, the second 
component represents the difference in choices as we move across the most distant and 
across the intermediate lottery panels and can be meaningfully interpreted as the 
                                                 
9 For more details about this task, see Attanasi et al. (2018), where meaningful alternative classifications 
of subjects are used based on the (non) monotonicity of choices as we move from P1 to P4. However, 
rather than the center of focus, in the present paper this task is used as a mere instrument for risk attitude 
elicitation.  
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reaction of choices to different risk return parameters. We will approximate this 
component by Factor2 = [2(P1-P4) + (P2-P3)] and we will refer to it with the term 
‘sensitivity to risk-returns’. 
Regarding the effect of these components on behavior in the main experiment, 
and assuming that the contribution by subjects to the public good can be seen as an 
uncertain prospect, we can formulate our third research question:  
(R3) More risk averse subjects (higher score in Factor1) should contribute less; 
subjects which are more sensitive to the risk return (higher score in Factor2) should 
contribute more, the higher the dispersion of MPCRs. 
 
 
5. Data analysis and main results  
 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
We ran two sessions for each treatment. Each session inv lved 36 participants.  Figure 6 
and Table 2 summarize our preliminary results. In comparison with the baseline, 
contributions are higher in the competition treatments TH and TL. In line with previous 
studies, the percentage of contribution in the baseline is around 50% of the endowment 
in the first period, and this level slowly declines along time. Although contribution 
levels are the highest in TH every period10, contribution in both treatments TH and TL 
show an increasing pattern. Interestingly, the highest contribution is observed in TH, the 
treatment in which we induced the highest level of competition. As a result, we confirm 
that not only intragroup competition fosters cooperation but, also, the degree of 
competition measured by the distance between the maximal and the minimal MPCR 
levels matters too.11 Observe in Table 2 that the difference in contribuion across 
treatments is statistically significant; the two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum for the 
comparison of average contribution at group level rejects the null hypothesis. 
 
                                                 
10 The difference in contribution is statistically sign ficant (the p-value is 0.01 from a two-sided Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test). 
11 In order to disentangle the effect of competition from that caused by the size of MPCR differences, we 
have compared these results with additional treatments, reported in a companion paper, in which 
heterogeneous MPCRs were randomly assigned after the contribution decision. We denote these as “risky 
treatments”. We have found that the contribution leve s when subjects compete for a higher MPCR are 






Figure 6: Average contribution (as % of total endowment) over time 
 
 
The pattern shown in Figure 6 confirms that competition fosters cooperation reflected 
on higher contributions at an aggregate level. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of contribution levels 
 
  Descriptive statistics Wilcoxon test 
Treatment N Group Mean Median SD Z p-value  
T0 720 24 36.87 30 31.29    
TH 720 24 67.92 80 34.31 -19.21 0.00  
TL 720 24 55.68 60 33.70 -11.88 0.00  
Note: The Wilcoxon test allows for the comparison between the baseline and the two competition 
treatments TH and TL at group level. 
 
The descriptive statistics in Table 2 highlight thedifferences between the baseline 
without competition and the two treatments with competition. Observe that TH is 
characterised by the highest mean and median contribution. One may conjecture that 
such evidence may imply that every subject in the group has contributed with amounts 
close or equal to the total endowment. However, this is contradicted by significant 
within-treatment heterogeneity, as indicated by the high standard deviations. To better 
understand whether subjects persistently contribute a high amount, we compute the 
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standard deviation of the contribution in each group.  In TH, where the distance between 
MPCR is higher, the heterogeneity among contributions at an individual level is 
exacerbated, as shown by the average standard deviation (15.65, 19.72 and 15.70 in 
treatments T0, TH and TL, respectively).  In order to analyse whether such 
heterogeneity is due to the existence of multiple NE characterising treatment TH –to 
invest either 0 or the whole endowment– we have extracted the share of subjects per 
treatment that behaved as free-rider (contributing ci=0) or full contributor (contributing 
ci=100) in each period.  
In Figure 7 we represent in solid blue line the trend of the percentage of free-
riders per period in each treatment, while the dashed red line describes the time 
evolution of the percentage of full contributors in each treatment.  Observe that in the 
baseline T0, the percentage of free-riders per period drastically increases along time 




Figure 7. Share of subjects contributing either 0 or 100 in each period. Blue dots represent 
the share of free-riders and the blue line is the linear fit of it. Red dots represent the share 
of full contributors and the red dashed line is the linear fit of that share.   
 
 
In TL the competition mechanism only boosts the percentag  of full contributors 
along time.  Related to TH, a substantial increase in the percentage of full contributors is 
detected, reaching 50%. In this treatment we observe that competition sustains high 
contribution levels, but also the percentage of free-riders marginally increases.  An 
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explanation for the increasing gap between the minial and maximal levels of 
contribution registered in TH over time may be found in that subjects play one of the 
two NE in pure strategies possible.  On one hand, we find subjects that prefer to reach 
the highest payoff by maximising the private investment, therefore contributing nothing. 
On the other hand, there are subjects maximising individual payoff by trying to get the 
maximum MPCR choosing full contribution to the public good. To test whether our 
conjecture is sustainable, we have identified whether competition affects the probability 
of playing not to contribute at all or choosing a full contribution. 
In a competitive environment, making a decision impl es taking into account 
others’ decisions. Furthermore, the individual decision to contribute is strongly affected 
by the MPCR received in the previous period. For example, subjects receiving the 
minimal MPCR in the previous period may be encouraged to free-ride in order to 
maximise private earnings in the current period.  We hypothesize that the probability to 
be either a free-rider (Pr(ci=0|X)) or a full contributor (Pr(ci=100|X)) may be described 
by the following formula:  
 
Pr(ci=0|X) = Const + β0 rankit-1 + β1 othersit-1 + TH + TL + ε   (1) 
Pr(ci=100|X) = Const + β0 rankit-1 + β1 othersit-1 + TH + TL + ε (2) 
 
where rankit-1 denotes is the lagged ranking assigned to each subject according to 
his/her level of contribution (i.e., the subject with the highest contribution receives 
rank=1 which corresponds to a MPCR of 0.9 in treatment TH and of 0.75 in TL).  The 
variable othersit-1 represents the lagged value of the aggregate contribution of all other 
subjects in the same group. Finally, TH and TL are treatment dummies.  
As displayed in Table 3, being a participant in trea ment TH (treatment TL) 
significantly increases (decreases) the probability to be a full contributor (free-rider). 
Notice that, far from expected, the reduction in the probability to free-ride is smaller in 
treatment TH –where competition is stronger– than in TL. Such an evidence constitutes 
a first support to our conjecture about the existence of multiple NE in TH.  The main 
difference between results in models (1) and (2) of Table 3 is found in the role played 
by the variable rankit-1, that is significant only for the probability of becoming a free-
rider.  In an indirect way, the MPCR received in the previous period becomes 
significant. On the contrary, the ranking in the previous period does not affect the 
willingness to choose full contribution. 
 17
Table 3. Panel probit regression models 
   
 (1) (2) 
Pr(c=0|X) Pr(c=100|X) 
      
rankit-1 0.16** -0.07 
(0.07) (0.05) 
othersit-1 -0.01*** 0.02*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
TH -0.89*** 1.66*** 
(0.32) (0.39) 
TL -1.68*** 0.821** 
(0.36) (0.391) 
Constant -1.05*** -4.95*** 
(0.28) (0.44) 
Observations 1,944 1,944 
Number of subjects 216 216 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Others’ contribution, on aggregate, has an effect in both dependent variables, although 
the impact is stronger on the probability of playing full contribution.  
To wrap up, the competition mechanism turns out to be an effective tool not only 
for increasing but also for sustaining full contribution within the group. However, the 
allocation of heterogeneous MPCRs according to the individual contribution leads to a 
controversial effect: there is a proportion of subjects who prefer not to take part in the 
competition but simply taking advantage by free-riding. This happens mostly in 
treatment TH, where both free-riding and full cooperation are NE. 
 
5.2. Determinants of the contribution level 
So far, we have shown that the existence of competition within subjects of the same 
group triggers cooperation. To better understand what are the main determinants of 
individual contributions, and to check whether risk preferences play a role in the 
investment decision, we run a mixed panel regression. We consider as a dependent 
variable the individual contribution, and observations are clustered at group level. The 
main explanatory variables that may have an effect on the individual contributions are: 
treatment dummies for TH and TL, and rankit-1, the individual (lagged) rank, assigned 
according to the subject’s contribution.  Furthermoe, the variable Factor1i is the 
average value of subject i choices in the four lottery panels, that is, (P1+P2 3+P4)/4. 
This factor is a proxy of the individual risk aversion, that is, the higher its value the 
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more risk averse the subject is.12  Factor2i is computed as [2*(P1-P4) + (P2-P3)], and 
measures subject i’s willingness to vary his/her choices as we move from lottery panel 
P1 to P4. It can be interpreted as the reaction of choices to different risk return 
parameters and we will refer to it as sensitivity to risk-returns. In order to verify 
whether there are significant differences among treatm nts, we add to our model the 
interaction of the aforementioned variables with the reatment dummies. Results of the 
model as well as of the nested models are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Linear mixed panel regression models with individual contribution as the 
dependent variable 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
TH 33.48*** 72.01*** 71.52*** 87.93*** 
(6.93) (7.14) (7.21) (5.31) 
TL 21.16*** 45.61*** 44.93*** 44.22*** 
(6.93) (7.10) (7.17) (5.37) 
ranki t-1 -3.087*** -0.39 -0.28 -0.08 
(0.44) (0.39) (0.41) (0.66) 
rank i t-1*TH -12.84*** -13.03*** -13.49*** 
(0.59) (0.60) (1.00) 
rank i t-1*TL -8.15*** -8.15*** -7.01*** 
(0.52) (0.55) (0.87) 
Factor1i 1.72 7.21 
(2.43) (5.26) 
Factor2 i 2.53* -8.24** 
(1.30) (3.27) 
Factor1i *TH -15.37** 
(7.39) 
Factor1i *TL 6.66 
(8.38) 
Factor2i *TH 13.98*** 
(5.39) 
Factor1i *TL 2.64 
(4.89) 
Constant 46.10*** 38.02*** 37.20*** 25.14*** 
  (5.07) (5.03) (5.23) (3.64) 
Observations 1,944 1,944 1,944 1,944 
Number of groups 72 72 72 72 
Wald  χ2=73.32*** χ2=792.61*** χ2= 740.27*** χ2= 693.63*** 
Observations are clustered at group level 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                 
12 Individual risk preferences were elicited straight after the experiment. In order to check whether th 
experiment may have influenced risk attitudes, we run a propensity score matching test comparing results 
in terms of Factor1. For the test we have used our experimental data and other sample in which the risk 
task was performed before the experiment. As a result, we have found no significant differences. The 
additional data sample and the results of the test are available from the authors upon request.  
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The positive and significant coefficients relative to the treatment dummies 
confirm that individual contribution is higher when competition is introduced, as shown 
in Figure 6. This result is robust to all the specifications considered. The coefficient 
relative to the rank (i.e. rankit-1), is negative
13 and significant in model (1) of this table.  
In the model specifications (2) to (4), the effect on contribution is captured by the 
interacted variable rank with the treatment dummies: the impact of past MPCR, 
indirectly measured by the variable, is stronger in treatment TH. This suggests that, in 
general, competition generates a virtuous circle: contributing more results in the highest 
MPCR and, as a result, the subject is willing to contribute more in order to maintain the 
same benefit.  
Concerning risk aversion, observe that Factor1i has no significant impact on 
individual contribution levels, whereas the sensitivity to risk-returns positively affects 
the willingness to contribute. In other words, the more a subject makes riskier choices 
when faced with higher returns to riskier options, the more the subject is likely to 
contribute in absolute terms. When introducing the int raction between risk aversion 
measures and the treatment dummies (see model (4) in the table), interesting second 
order effects emerge. Factor1i turns out to be significant when interacted with the TH 
dummy, which means that, in a context with high uncertainty about the MPCR, risk 
averse subjects are less willing to contribute. Regarding the sensitivity to risky returns 
(measured by Factor2i), observe in model (3) that the higher the propensity to take 
higher risks as we move from panel P1 to P4, the higher the propensity to take the risk 
of contributing more. In model (4), the interaction f Factor2i with the treatment 
dummy variable TH is positive and significant. Specifically, the effect of the 
corresponding interaction coefficient indicates that a subject’s sensitivity to risky 
returns becomes more significant in explaining contribu ions as we move from T0 to 
TH. 
As a result, the estimates of the econometric models in Table 4 answer the 
research questions. In fact, both TH and TL dummy coefficients are significant at 1%, 
indicating that the presence of intragroup competition for a higher individual return of 
the public good increases individual contributions in comparison to the levels observed 
in the baseline where returns are not linked to a group member’s relative contribution 
                                                 
13 Notice that a value of 1 for variable rank is assigned to the subject with the highest contribu ion. This 
means that the higher the contribution the lower th value of the rank variable.  
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(R1). Moreover, the size of the aforementioned dummy coefficients indicates that the 
effect of competition for a higher individual return is sensitive to the magnitude of the 
difference between individual return factors (R2). Therefore, competition matters more 
the higher is the x post asymmetry in individual returns induced by the relative ranking 
of individual contributions. The sensitivity to the magnitude of the x post asymmetry is 
especially interesting when such individual return differences are used as an incentive 
for the members of the group to increase their contributions. Our results show that 
increasing the x post asymmetry is an efficient instrument leading to collectively better 
outcomes.  
Taking into account subjects’ risk preferences, a possible explanation for our main 
results may be that the effect of competition for a higher in-group rank is risk attitude-
related, and is driven by subjects’ heterogeneous degrees of sensitivity to variations in 





The purpose of this paper has been to investigate wh ther intragroup competition 
enhances subjects’ contributions to a public good. In order to test the impact of 
intragroup competition on the level of cooperation, we have revisited the standard PGG 
(T0) and add two new treatments (TH, TL) in which three different values of the MPCR 
are assigned to group members so that subjects are rank d according to the size of their 
own contribution to the public good. The two treatments TH and TL include competition 
within a group and differ only in the “degree of competition”. In particular, in treatment 
TH the distance between the minimal and the maximal values of the MPCR is equal to 
0.6, exactly twice the difference in treatment TL.  
Our results confirm our three research questions. Specifically, the more each 
group member can individually benefit from the final outcome, the more the subject 
contributes to the common project. Furthermore, the individual level of contribution is 
affected by the salience of differences among indivdual returns according to the 
member’s intragroup ranking, thus resulting in a signif cantly higher level of 
contributions in treatment TH. 
Finally, we have shown that our results are related to the subject’s proneness to 
take higher risks when motivated by higher returns to risk. We have elicited individual 
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risk preferences through the Lottery Panels risk elicitation task by Sabater and 
Georgantzis (2002). We have computed what we call Factor1, the average choices in the 
four panels; and Factor2 which is the sensitivity to risky-returns. We find out that more 
risk averse subjects contribute less, and subjects who are more sensitive to the risk 
return contribute more the higher the dispersion of MPCRs. 
Our experimental results contribute to the understanding of how mechanisms in 
which returns from the public good are commensurate wi h the amount of resources 
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 Appendix. Experimental instructions (translated from the original in Spanish) 
 
Treatment T0 (Baseline) 
 
Thank you very much for being here.  The instructions are identical to all 
participants. Read them carefully. If you have any questions or concerns, please raise 
your hand and we will answer your questions individually.  During the session, it is 
strictly forbidden to communicate with the other participants.  
The unit of experimental money will be the ExCU (Experimental Currency 
Unit), where 100 ECU = €10. At the end of the session one of your decisions will be 
randomly chosen. Note that all choices are equally likely. The experimental payoff 
corresponding to the selected decision will be calculated, converted to Euros, and 
paid to you (privately) in cash.  
 
The Experiment 
The experiment consists of 10 independent periods in which you will interact with 2 
other participants in the session. The 3 of you form a group that will remain THE 
SAME in all periods. The identity of the participants of your group will not be 
revealed to you at all during the session.  
At the beginning of each period, each participant receives an endowment of 100 
ECU.  In any period, each member of a group has to take a decision. 
 
Every period, you have to decide how much of your endowment you want to 
contribute to a common project. Your contribution decision must be not smaller 
than 0 ECU and not greater than 100 ECU. Furthermore, it must be an integer 
number. Whatever you do not contribute, you keep it for yourself (“ECU you 
keep”). 
In every period, your earnings consist of two parts: 
(1) the “ECU you keep”= [100 –  your contribution] ECU;  
(2) the “income from the project”. 
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The “income from the project” is calculated by adding up the contributions of the 3 
members of your group and multiplying the resulting sum by a number that we call 
α. That is:  
Income from the project = [Your contribution + Your partners’ contribution] × α 
The multiplier α is equal to 0.6.  [TH:  The multiplier α can be either 0.9 or 0.6 or 
0.3, where each value is equally likely.] [TL:  The multiplier α can be either 0.75 or 
0.6 or 0.45, where each value is equally likely.].  
You have to decide about your contribution without knowing the value of α. 
The income from the project is determined in the same way for every member of 
a group; this means that you all receive the same income from the project, regardless 
of the size of your individual contributions. 
[TH: The income from the project is determined as follows: members in the group 
will be ranked in accordance to the size of their individual contributions. The 
highest contributor gets α=0.9 [TL:α=0.75] as return from the project; the second 
contributor gets α=0.6 and the lowest contributor gets α=0.3 [TL: α=0.45] . If more than 
one member makes the same contribution (that is, they are equally ranked), the return 
per capita will be calculated as follows:  
• If all three members make the same contribution, each receives 
α = (0.9 + 0.6 + 0.3) /3 = 0.6 [TL: α=(0.75+0.6+0.45)/3=0.6] ;  
• If two members make the highest contribution (they both are ranked as first), 
they both receive α = (0.9 + 0.6)/2=0.75  [TL: α=(0.75+0.6)/2=0.675] while the 
third member receives α=0.3 [TL: α=0.45] ; 
• If two members make the lowest contribution (they are r nked as third), they 
receive α=(0.6 + 0.3)/2=0.45 [TL: α=(0.6+0.45)/2=0.525] and the first 
contributor receives α=0.9 [TL: α=0.75]] .  
 
EXAMPLE: If the sum of the contributions of the three members is 60 ECU, each 
member receives an income from the project equal to (0.6 × 60) = 36 ECU.  
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[Treatment H: EXAMPLE: If the sum of the contributions of the three members is 60 
ECU, the contributor ranked as first receives an income from the project of (0.9 × 
60) = 54 ECU [TL: (0.75 × 60) = 45 ECU]; the second receives (0.6 × 60) = 36 ECU 
and the third (0.3 × 60) = 18 ECU [TL: (0.45 x 60) =27 ECU]. However, for instance: 
• If all the members are equally ranked they receive (0.6 × 60) = 36 ECU per 
capita; 
• If two members are ranked as first, they both receive [(0.9 + 0.6)/2 × 60] = 45 
ECU [TL: [(0.75 + 0.6)/2 x 60] = 0.67 x 60= 40.2 ECU] per capita; the third 
receives (0.3 × 60) = 18 ECU [TL: (0.45 x 60) = 27 ECU]; 
• If two members are ranked as third, they both receive [(0.6 + 0.3)/2 × 60] = 27 
ECU [TL: (0.6+ 0.45)/2 x 60 = 0.525 x 60 = 31.5 ECU] per capita; the highest 
receives (0.9 × 60) = 54 ECU [TL:  (0.75 x 60) = 45 ECU].  
 
At the end of each period you will receive information about the contribution of 
your partners and your corresponding period-earnings in that period. 
Before the experiment starts, you will have to answer some control questions to 
verify your understanding of the rules of the experiment. 
Please remain seated quietly until the experiment starts. If you have any 
question, please raise your hand. 
